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Abstract 
The paper explores the readiness of the Turkish banking sector for integration into the European Union. We 
address the issue from four different angles. First, we review the present structure and health of the sector, 
including the state of the regulatory framework, providing where possible a comparative perspective with the larger 
EU accession countries. Second, we look at the sector’s financial solidity in 2003, with a view to gauging its 
readiness to adapt to a more challenging banking environment. Third, we look at the present obstacles to financial 
deepening and identify the most pressing issues that seem to hinder the sector’s growth. Fourth, we explore issues 
of productivity and efficiency in the sector. In a final section, we ask the question of whether the Turkish banking 
sector is or will be ready in due time for EU accession and formulate some policy recommendations. We conclude 
that in 2004 the Turkish banking sector compares well with those of the new members of the EU. The major source 
of financial instability in the past was macroeconomic instability and government involvement. At present Turkey 
is closer to achieving macro-stability than ever in the past, and the government is reducing its direct involvement. 
Major strides have been accomplished after the crisis of 2001 in cleaning up a very nontransparent and politicized 
banking environment and in upgrading the regulatory structure to EU standards. Clearly, the job is not finished yet, 
with the challenge of introducing risk-management based on Basle II and of bringing the capital market to EU 
standards. Further consolidation and mergers with foreign partners will be inevitable. Should EU integration 
become a concrete vision of the future, macro stability has great chances to become rooted in Turkey and the 
banking sector will quickly move to EU standards, long before any accession date. 
Alfred Steinherr is Chief Economist of the European Investment Bank. Ali Tukel is a faculty member at Bogazici 
University. Murat Ucer is EuroSource’s economist for Turkey and adjunct faculty member at Koc University. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Turkish banking sector (TBS) went through major consolidation during 1999-2003 in the 
aftermath of a failed disinflation programme (December 1999–February 2001), a devastating financial 
crisis and a renewed IMF programme that brought about the recovery. In early 2004, relative 
macroeconomic stability appeared to have been achieved, and having gone through the worst, the 
sector appeared set for the next phase of consolidation and growth. At this interesting juncture, this 
paper explores the readiness of the TBS for integration into the European Union. The issue is 
addressed from four different angles. First, we review the present structure and health of the sector, 
including the state of the regulatory framework, providing a comparative perspective with the larger 
EU accession countries (section 2). One broad conclusion that follows is that the sector has gone 
through much rehabilitation and recovery already, and painful as it was, the banking environment is 
now much improved and has a first-class regulatory framework. 
Second, we look at the sector’s financial indicators in 2003, with a view to gauging its readiness to 
adapt to a more challenging banking environment (section 3). Banks were very profitable in 2003, but 
this profitability was largely based on the large share of Treasury-bill holdings in banks’ portfolios and 
a spectacular, but arguably one-off rally in yields, while the contribution of true banking activities to 
profits remained low. Third, we look at the present obstacles to good banking, based in part on 
interviews with a number of senior bank executives, to identify the most critical issues that hinder 
progress in the sector (section 4). Until recently, the sector suffered from chronic macroeconomic 
instability, heavy taxation and a weak loan portfolio. There are promising signs that we may be in the 
early stages of a much more stable macro-environment and reducing taxation of the sector seems to be 
a priority in the IMF/World Bank programme. Yet macro-stability is tenuous, reducing financial taxes 
will likely proceed slowly and steps to clean up the bad loan portfolio appear to have stalled. 
Moreover, state banks’ dominant share in the sector, combined with a seeming lack of willingness 
toward their privatisation, creates a major obstacle to enhancing efficiency in the sector. 
In section 5, we explore issues of efficiency in banking. Admittedly, this is a very wide and technical 
area that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Thus we look at a few broad indicators of efficiency, 
highlight key findings of a comprehensive productivity study by the consulting group McKinsey on 
retail banking and share anecdotal evidence on the competitiveness of Turkish banks.  
In section 6, we summarise our findings to assess whether the TBS is ready for EU accession. We 
conclude that the TBS is already at the level of comparator countries such as Poland or Greece before 
they joined the EU. There is still scope for important improvements, however, for which we make a 
number of policy suggestions. Though in principle the country has some ten years to prepare for actual 
membership, carrying out these reforms swiftly would help Turkey to grow faster and catch up with 
EU averages sooner. 
                                                 
*
∗ This paper benefited from the comments of participants in a workshop held in Brussels in May 2004. We 
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2.  Crisis and recovery 
A broad review of the restructuring, consolidation and recovery process that the sector underwent in 
the past three years is critical to understanding the current state of play as well as the way forward for 
the sector. In what follows, we provide a brief background on the context in which Turkey started 
banking sector reform, an overview of the rehabilitation programme that followed the 2001 crisis and 
a snapshot picture of the current structure of the sector, compared with larger European Union 
accession countries. 
2.1  In search of macroeconomic stability 
At the onset of the disinflation programme in late 1999, the TBS had several weaknesses, centring on 
some sort of a ‘live and let live’ game between the Treasury (the major borrower with an ever-growing 
deficit) and the banks (the main lenders, thanks to a lucrative ‘carry trade’ based on the maintenance 
of large, open foreign-exchange positions). In the late 1990s, any observer of the Turkish economy 
would have agreed that the sector was marred by several deep-seated problems: a politicised 
regulatory structure and weak enforcement; pervasive connected-lending practices; several lemons that 
had survived thanks to T-bill carry trade and deposit insurance; cash-starved state banks; and 
inadequate capital for the risk exposure of most banks. Clearly Turkey’s chronic macroeconomic 
instability lied at the heart of these problems. Inflation ratcheted up slowly to above 80%, while 
growth remained extremely volatile (Figures 1 and 2).
1 
Figure 1. Trends in inflation over the past two decades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The latter averaged 4% over 1981-2002, which was respectable, but the standard deviation was 5. 
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Figure 2. Trends in growth over the past two decades 
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Financial intermediation, measured by the ratios of assets and loans to gross national product (GNP), 
increased quite significantly through the mid-1990s, but then stalled thereafter and experienced a 
major setback during the crisis years of 2001-02 (Figure 3). Financial intermediation, particularly as 
measured by the private loans-to-GNP ratio, increased strongly until 1997 to reach 30% before 
declining to less than 20% in 2001-02. Value-added growth in the financial sector stayed well below 
the economy’s already weak growth rate as a whole and since 2002 has been below the level of 1990 
(Figure 4).
2  
Figure 3. Banking sector assets and credit to the private sector (% of GNP) 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
Assets
Loans (right hand side)
 
 
                                                 
2 See section 4 for a brief overview of the academic literature regarding the link between financial development 
(or good finance) and growth, along with a suggestive thought exercise on Turkey. 4 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
Figure 4. GNP versus financial services (value-added; 1990 = 100) 
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The December 1999 IMF-supported disinflation programme sought to address Turkey’s chronic 
macroeconomic instability, including a growing public debt problem, at a time when the situation had 
become largely unsustainable. The programme aimed at reducing inflation using an exchange-rate 
anchor. But it sought to balance risks associated with programmes based on exchange rates by 
incorporating an ‘exit strategy’ to the peg (which entailed widening of the band 18 months into the 
programme) and supporting it by an ambitious package of structural reforms and a sizeable fiscal 
adjustment. As for the banking sector, the programme strategy was to reform the sector gradually, 
with above-normal profits in the first year of the programme used for partial recapitalisation of the 
sector. At the heart of this transformation was a new Banking Act, which called for the establishment 
of an independent Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) to take over the supervisory 
and regulatory functions from the Treasury. 
But risks were badly aggravated in due course, and the programme came under attack in November 
2000 and collapsed a few months later, with the lira left to float in February. As banking sector 
excesses played a significant role in bringing about the demise of the programme, the sector was in a 
very weak financial position in the aftermath of the crisis. The collapse subsequently led to a forced 
consolidation and a massive injection of public funds into the TBS. The cost of restructuring amounted 
to over $50 billion or some 35% of 2001 GNP, including a relatively small amount of funds injected 
by the private sector itself (Table 1). As the table shows, the restructuring cost to the Treasury of state 
banks as well as banks taken over by the Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) made up the 
lion’s share of these costs, each at around 15% of GNP.
3 On the other hand, the cost of recapitalisation 
operations to the private sector, including a small sum met from the SDIF’s own resources, was a 
relatively small chunk of the total restructuring costs (some 6.4% of GNP). 
                                                 
3 To clarify, the SDIF met a small chunk of the costs from its own resources, i.e. through premiums paid by the 
banking sector that had accumulated at the SDIF over time, but the remainder was met through securities on loan 
to the SDIF in return for ‘IOUs’ and future collections. The SDIF has recently been separated from the BRSA, 
with a view to stepping up collection efforts. Thus far, the SDIF has managed to collect about $2 billion and 
there is occasionally talk of SDIF’s debt to the Treasury being written off. THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 5 
 
Table 1. The cost of the banking sector crisis 
  US $ bn  % of GDP 
Cost to the Treasury  43.7 29.5 
Restructuring of state banks  21.9  14.8 
‘Duty losses’  19.0  12.8 
Recapitalisation 2.9  2.0 
For private banks transferred to the SDIF  21.8  14.7 
Cost to the private sector  9.5 6.4 
Cost borne by the SDIF  6.7  4.5 
Capital injection by shareholders  2.8  1.9 
Total 53.2  35.9 
Source: BRSA (2003b); Table 12 of the report was modified to include $6 
billion of Imar Bank-related losses. 
These figures make the Turkish banking crisis one of the most costly in recent history. The good news 
is that this painful process of collapse and recovery has led to two major improvements: the sector has 
now become much leaner and the regulatory structure became almost fully aligned with international 
standards. 
2.2  The rehabilitation programme and evolution of the regulatory structure 
The May 2001 Rehabilitation Programme, formulated and executed by the BRSA in consultation with 
the IMF/World Bank, took a four-prong approach to banking rehabilitation: it sought to restructure 
state banks, resolve banks taken over by the SDIF, strengthen the financial structure of private banks 
and further improve the regulatory and supervisory framework.
4 Although state bank restructuring was 
completed in the early phases of the programme and the modification of the regulatory structure 
advanced broadly on schedule – slowly upgrading the system to international standards – progress as 
regards the strengthening of private banks and resolution of SDIF banks was relatively slow.  
The BRSA opted for restructuring and the sale of banks taken over by the SDIF rather than outright 
liquidation (other than Imar Bank) because of multiple concerns (e.g., to avoid bank runs, to minimise 
interest and exchange-rate volatility, and to ensure debt sustainability) (BRSA, 2003b). This in turn 
contributed to substantial slowing down of the process. As for private banks, the BRSA’s approach 
was completely passive in the first year of the programme, leaving the recovery in bank assets largely 
to the resumption of economic growth and capital strengthening to injections by shareholders or 
voluntary mergers. In late 2001, a prolonged recession and continued decline in credit forced the 
BRSA to become more proactive by officially undertaking a recap operation in June 2002. Around the 
same time, the BRSA formulated and launched the legal framework to enable smooth functioning of 
two non-performing loan (NPL) workout mechanisms – the so-called ‘Istanbul Approach’ and the 
establishment of the Asset Management Corporation (AMC). Even then, however, there has been 
limited success: the recap operation provided an opportunity for an in-depth penetration into private 
bank balance sheets and greatly enhanced transparency, but the actual capital injections needed, 
                                                 
4 Through regular reports the BRSA kept the public informed about the banking sector restructuring process, 
hence we provide only a brief overview here. On the approach taken, see various IMF letters of intent and BRSA 
presentations, as well as Akcay (2003) and World Bank (2003). The BRSA’s approach followed the insights of 
the economic literature on crisis resolution – see Gray & Holle (1996 and 1997), Dziobek & Pazarbasioglu 
(1997) and Tang et al. (2000).  6 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
somewhat surprisingly, turned out to be much smaller than envisaged, while non-performing loan 
rescue mechanisms continue to operate very slowly (see Box 3 in section 4 below).
5 
Yet, in the aftermath of a crisis-ridden period, it is perhaps fair to argue that Turkey has largely paid 
its dues and the restructuring programme was broadly successful in cleaning up the banking 
environment from its previous excesses and weaknesses. By early 2004, 21 domestic private banks 
had been taken over (19 of these between the onset of the disinflation programme in late 1999 and 
mid-2003) and the number of domestic private commercial banks in the system had declined to 18. 
Moreover, the capital base of the remaining private banks had largely been replenished, and the state 
banks had been operationally restructured under new management and ceased to be a major source of 
‘liquidity risk’ for the markets. Indications are that the remaining ‘contingent liabilities’ in the sector 
are unlikely to exceed 5% of GNP – a manageable level compared to the overall cost of the crisis.
6 
Perhaps most importantly, the regulatory framework had already gone through several amendments, 
broadly coming to par with EU standards (Box 1). Although the recent ‘Imar Bank’ episode dealt a 
serious blow to the credibility of the regulatory framework in general and to that of the BRSA in 
particular, the scale of the ‘fraud’ suggests that it was more than just a simple case of regulatory 
oversight and its implications for the existing regulatory framework should hence be assessed 
carefully (see Annex 1). 
Box 1. Key changes effected in the regulatory structure, from 1999 to the present 
The reform of the regulatory structure picked up in the run-up to the 1999 disinflation programme. In June 
1999, a new Banking Act was passed (No. 4389), which, among others, called for the establishment of a new 
autonomous banking agency (the BRSA) and the resumption of its operations in September 2000. This was a 
welcome step given that, while the regulatory framework needed much improvement (especially with regard 
to connected-lending practices, transparency and consolidated accounts, etc.), the key problem had been the 
lack of enforcement rather than the regulatory framework as such. After some haggling over the selection of 
board members, the coalition government managed to put together a board in late July 2000 and appointed the 
head of the BRSA in August. Inevitably though, the financial crisis of 2001 shifted the focus of the newly 
born BRSA from supervision to restructuring and rehabilitation. Over a course of three years, the following 
key changes were affected in the regulatory system.  
Main amendments to the banking law. The Banking Act was fully revised in June 1999 and went through 
several amendments thereafter (a total of seven, including the latest draft law that seeks to further strengthen 
rules for bank ownership). Several of the amendments sought to strengthen the BRSA and accelerate asset 
collection. One of the major amendments was implemented to proceed with the recap by passing a provisional 
article (Art. 4) as a part of comprehensive legislation (the Law on Financial Sector Restructuring, No. 4743). 
This legislation defined, among other things, a broad framework for corporate debt restructuring and allowed 
for the establishment of an AMC. The latest round of amendments, which are expected to be legislated by the 
end of November this year according to the IMF programme, seeks to bring the legal framework more closely 
in line with EU standards. As explained in the latest letter of intent (see July 2004), the law focuses on 
strengthening the legal framework in the following areas: (i) "fit and proper" criteria for bank owners; (ii) on-
site inspections; (iii) lending to related parties; (iv) legal protection for BRSA and SDIF board members and 
staff for actions taken in good faith during the course of their duties; and (v) delineating the responsibilities of 
BRSA and SDIF respectively and providing for their effective coordination. 
Capital adequacy. To bring the practice in line with international standards, the capital adequacy ratio 
calculation was expanded to include capital charges for market risks on a solo basis and monitoring of internal 
control and risk-management systems starting 1 January 2002, and on a consolidated basis from 1 July 2002. 
                                                 
5 The recap plan had three phases that extended through the end of June 2002, from the completion of three 
separate audits on the basis of December 2001 balance sheets to the injection of public funds. The two audits 
were conducted by the banks’ own auditors and an externally designated auditor for each bank, respectively, and 
the final audit was essentially a judgment call by the BRSA.  
6 At the time of writing, it appeared that the Treasury would issue securities of another 0.5% of GNP or so to 
enable the merger of Pamukbank, one of the two banks remaining under SDIF management, and Halkbank, the 
smaller of the two state banks.  THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 7 
 
Capital adequacy ratios are now calculated every quarter, with on- and off-balance sheet risks incorporated in 
the calculation. 
Foreign exchange (F/X) exposure of banks. To limit F/X exposure further, the ratio was brought to +/- 20% of 
bank equity on a consolidated basis as of 1 January 2002. To identify structured finance products and to 
minimise risks, the BRSA established a new committee and a new set of rules. 
Connected-lending practices. New regulations introduced the concept of a ‘risk group’ and defined the 
shareholders of a bank and its participations as belonging to the same risk group. Replacing the narrow 
definition of the previous period, which had led to much abuse of connected lending, this concept led to 
increased transparency of the connected-lending practices. The amount of exposure a bank can take with each 
risk group was reduced from 75% of the bank’s net worth to 25%. In order to comply with this drastic 
restriction in connected lending, banks were allowed an adjustment period, whereby the ratio would gradually 
decline from 75% to 25% by 2007. These limits are being monitored by the BRSA and the relevant 
information is included in the audited financial statements, which are made public. 
Limits on participations in non-financial sectors. In the past, conglomerates used their bank to finance their 
other businesses, frequently in industries unrelated to finance. New regulations limit the amount that banks 
can invest in other businesses. Banks can now invest only 15% of their net in a non-financial subsidiary and 
the sum of such participations cannot exceed 60% of net worth. The TBS is allowed a transition period until 
2009 to comply with this rule. 
Loan-loss reserves and provisioning. The regulations for loan-loss treatment and provision requirements, 
which are fully consistent with EU standards, were introduced and became effective as of July 2001. The new 
regulations require a detailed classification of all loans and other receivables from borrowers into five 
categories: standard, watch-list, limited collection possibility, doubtful collection possibility and write-off. 
Any loans that have a deterioration of credit or collateral quality, or in any case a non-payment of principal or 
interest on the due date should be moved out of the ‘standard’ category. If the non-payment period exceeds 
180 days, the loan is progressively re-classified into the last three categories, which are considered ‘non-
performing’ categories that prompt provisioning requirements. Loan provisioning starts at 20% and all loans 
with a non-payment period of one year must be fully provisioned. The classification of one loan into a non-
performing category requires the classification of all loans to the same borrower into non-performing 
categories, hence providing a strong disincentive for the connected-lending practices of the past. In addition to 
these special provisions, there are general provisions at the rate of five per 1000 of total loans outstanding and 
one per 1000 of all contingent liabilities. The provisioning regulations outlined above have been fully 
operational since January 2002, with the termination of a transition period. 
Risk-management practices. To promote internal control and risk-measurement systems, a new practice that 
requires a well-defined structure and organisation for risk measurement and control has been set forth. The 
setting up of internal systems for banks is now underway and implementation is expected in 2005.  
Accounting and audit practices. To fully adopt the international framework, a new set of accounting policies 
was announced. Implementation of the full set began in July 2002, after completing the design of the internal 
systems of the banks. Consolidated reporting requires incorporating the offshore subsidiaries of domestic 
banks. The switch to inflation accounting was achieved as of January 2003. To establish standards for 
specifications of external audit and auditors, a new set of rules and practices were announced. External audits 
are now required to include examinations of the loan portfolio and market risks as well as of internal control 
and risk-management systems (effective January 2002). Offshore banks that are related to Turkish banks are 
now covered by BRSA audits. 
Non-bank financial institutions. Regulation and supervision of non-bank financial institutions will be 
transferred from the Treasury to the BRSA by January 1, 2005. 
2.3  The present structure 
Where does the TBS now stand in terms of size, market structure, asset and liability composition in 
comparison with five of the EU accession countries from the Central and Eastern European countries 
(henceforth the CEEC-5)?
7 With 21 private banks having been taken over or outright dissolved by the 
                                                 
7 The EU accession countries used for comparisons in this section include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 8 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
SDIF, the number of private banks is now much reduced and it is hard to talk of the TBS as being 
‘over-banked’ (see Table 2). Moreover, compared to the size of the economy, the TBS is still 
relatively small: total assets stood at some 60% of GDP at the end of 2003, which is less than EU 
averages. Meanwhile, total assets of private banks only stood at 40% of GDP, which is not much 
smaller than the ratio in the CEEC-5.  
Table 2. Number of banks and asset sizes 
 Czech  Rep. Poland Slovakia Slovenia Hungary  Turkey
Number of commercial banks  42 75 21 25  33  14
Total bank assets (as a % of GDP)  181 65 96 79  65  60
Sources: Wagner & Iakova (2001) for the CEEC-5 (for 2000) and the Banks Association for Turkey (for 2003). 
As for concentration, the industry is dominated by seven large banks (three state-owned banks and 
four private ones), which account for 75% of the sector. The share of the five largest banks – a 
common indicator of concentration – stands at some 60% (as of September, 2003), which is higher 
than the EU average of 50% and lower than the average of EU accession countries of 75% 
(Pazarbasioglu, 2003). This is a fair ratio in that the level of competition in the sector is sufficiently 
high to prevent the development of a monopolistic service provider with a price-setting capability, but 
also, the sector is not too fragmented to preclude reaping the benefit of economies of scale. 
The structure of the TBS differs from the banking sectors of the CEEC-5 in two important aspects. 
First, the share of state-owned banks in the CEEC-5 has declined rapidly in the past decade to 5% in 
Hungary and 23% in Poland, with no state banks remaining in the Czech Republic. In Turkey, the two 
state-owned banks, Ziraat Bank (the Agricultural Bank, which has a public mission to lend to farmers) 
and Halk Bank (which has a public mission to lend to small- and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs]) 
together account for 27% of the Turkish banking sector (year-end 2002 figures, in terms of total 
assets). If Vakifbank (a special-status bank owned by foundations) is included, this rises even further 
to 34%. Second, the CEEC-5 has relied on foreign strategic ownership: in Poland and Hungary, for 
instance, foreign-owned banks account for 77% of the banking assets and in the Czech Republic for 
94%, while in Turkey the ratio is only 5%.
8  
In terms of the ratio of deposits to GDP, Turkey compares evenly to EU accession countries and to 
some of the EU members (e.g., Italy) (Table 3). But in terms of the composition of assets, Turkey 
appears to differ significantly from EU members and the CEEC-5. One of the most striking differences 
is Turkey’s low private-sector-loans-to-GDP ratio (at some 18%), which is lower than in EU countries 
(both incumbent and accession), and the high share of government securities in total assets (some 
44%). As of December 2003, the private-sector-loans-to-GDP ratio had recovered (25%), and the ratio 
of government securities in total assets had declined (42.8%). 
Table 3. Deposit and loan levels 
 Germany  France  Spain  Italy  Greece  Czech Poland  Hungary Turkey 
Deposits/GDP 95.5  64.8  81.0  52.5  56.0  64.5  34.4 38.7  50.0 
Loans/GDP 121.0  88.1  106.0  62.7  52.0  41.3  25.2  28.9  17.8 
Sources: Pazarbasioglu (2003) and EIB data; figures for EU and candidate countries are for 2000 and 2001; for Turkey these 
are end-2002 (BRSA figures). 
                                                 
8 In Turkey there are a large number of licensed, foreign-owned banks: 13 of the 37 commercial banks are either 
fully-owned subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks. Their operations are, however, mostly limited to a single 
branch and to corporate banking. Only three of them – Kocbank, (where Credito Italiano has a 50% stake), 
HSBC and Citibank – have a multi-branch retail presence. A fourth one, Bank Europa (a subsidiary of Banco 
Comercial Portugues), has started to build a network. THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 9 
 
The picture improves somewhat when we break down these figures into private and state-owned banks 
(Table 4). The share of government securities in the total assets of state banks is significantly higher 
than for private banks (60% versus the sector average of 42.5%), with private banks generally doing a 
better job in channelling private savings into private credit. The position of Halkbank, the smaller of 
the two state banks, is particularly noteworthy in that, despite a mandate to primarily lend to SMEs, 
the bank appears to fail badly in performing this function, with 80% of its assets placed in government 
securities.  
Table 4. The public versus private asset allocation of the TBS, end 2002 (%) 
 State  Private  Total 
Loans/total  assets  14.4 33.2 27.7 
Government securities/total assets  60.0  35.5  42.5 
Source: Turkish Banks Association. 
There is also a significant difference in the composition of deposits by denomination. Turkish 
individuals and corporates can open sight and savings deposits in foreign currencies as well as in 
Turkish lira. The share of foreign currency deposits is close to half at 45% in early 2004. While state 
banks have 42% of total deposits versus the private banks’ share of 53%, this ratio is almost reversed 
in TL deposits. State banks have 57% of Turkish lira deposits and private banks have 40%. Private 
banks have 70% of foreign currency deposits. 
3.  Overview of the financial solidity of banks in 2003 
The past two years, especially 2003, have been good for the sector, helping it to recoup some of the 
losses from the 2001 crisis. What has been the key source of this profitability? Can it last? In this 
section, we briefly explore these questions. After sharing a few observations on the sector as a whole, 
we take a somewhat more detailed look at the financial indicators of the banks listed on the Istanbul 
stock exchange (ISE). In a nutshell, we come up with two broad, and admittedly simple, observations: 
notwithstanding the sharp improvement in profitability, it is unlikely to last, and though capital 
adequacy ratios look healthy, the free capital of the sector is quite low. These indications, in turn, 
suggest that although 2003 was a successful year for the TBS, the sector is not necessarily well-
positioned for a more challenging banking environment. 
3.1  A general assessment 
Real assets of the sector remained broadly stable in 2003 (reflecting the impact of real appreciation on 
the relatively large share [some 45%] of F/X-linked assets and deposits in the balance sheets), but 
profitability remained high (Tables 5 and 6).  
After a TL 2.4 quadrillion (some $1.5 billion) in net earnings (before tax) in 2002, the sector managed 
to generate another TL 5.7 quadrillion (some $4 billion) last year – a 100% growth in real terms. As 
Table 5 indicates, ‘trading activities’, i.e., gains associated with the rally in interest and exchange 
rates, appear to be the main driver of this profitability, with TL 6.7 quadrillion net trading gains out of 
some TL 8 quadrillion of net income before tax. But this is not very surprising. Real interest rates on 
government borrowing were high during most of the period, but have declined sharply since the end of 
the Iraqi war (Figure 5), thereby allowing banks to record hefty profits on a marked-to-market basis. 
Combined with the large share of securities in bank portfolios noted in the earlier section, the rally in 
yields led to significantly higher profits than in earlier years (Figure 6). 10 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
Table 5. Selected items from the balance sheet of the banking sector 
 2003  2002 
Total assets (in quad TL)  249.7  212.7 
(12-month real growth; %)  -6.3  -13.5 
(% of total)     
SDIF 2.8  4.4 
Public banks  33.3  31.9 
Private banks  57.0  56.2 
Foreign banks  2.8  3.1 
Investment and Development banks  4.1  4.4 
Loans (% of assets)  26.2  23.1 
(% of total)     
Public banks  18.5  15.5 
Private banks  70.0  69.5 
Nonperforming loans (as a % of gross loans)  3.6  7.6 
Public banks  6.6  15.6 
Private banks  2.7  4.6 
Securities portfolio (% of total assets)  42.7  40.5 
(% of total)     
Public banks  44.8  45.6 
Private banks  48.3  46.2 
Deposits (% of total)     
Public banks  38.6  35.1 
Private banks  56.9  58.4 
Net earnings (as a % of total assets)  2.3  1.1 
(% of total)     
Public banks  31.5  44.8 
Private banks  51.4  103.1 
Open F/X positions (gross; $ billion)  0.0  -0.6 
o/w: private banks  -0.4  -0.5 
Capital adequacy ratio (%)     
Total 30.9  26.1 
Public banks  56.3  48.3 
Private banks  23.5  19.6 
Foreign banks  36.2  32.6 
Sources: BRSA and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6. Selected income statement items 
 2000  2001  2002  2003 
Net earnings  -2.8  -11.9  2.4  5.7 
Net interest income (after provisions)  2.6  9.1  9.2  8.6 
Interest income  22.6 58.2 44.4 39.3 
Loans 7.6  15.4  10.4  10.5 
Banks 2.9  8.6  1.5  0.9 
Securities 4.2  20.4  27.5  23.2 
Other interest expense  7.9  13.8  5.0  4.7 
Interest expenses  18.0  39.9  31.6  28.0 
Deposits 11.3  30.1  26.3  23.2 
Other 6.7  9.8  5.3  4.8 
Provisions (past-due and unexpected loan losses)  2.1  9.2  3.6  2.6 
Net non-interest income  -4.7  -20.0  -5.7  -0.5 
Non-interest income  3.3  5.5  7.7  7.2 
Non-interest expenditure  6.3  11.0  12.1  12.7 
Specific non-interest income  -1.7  -14.5  -1.2  5.0 
Net trading gains  -1.7  -11.0  0.9  6.7 
Net capital market transactions  0.3  -1.2  3.3  5.1 
Net F/X transactions  -2.0  -9.7  -2.4  1.6 
Net income from extraordinary transactions  0.0  -3.6  0.0  0.1 
Net income from net monetary polistion  0.0  0.0  -2.1  -1.8 
Net income before tax  -2.1  -10.9  3.5  8.1 
Tax 0.7  1.0  1.2  2.5 
Sources: BRSA and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 5. Real interest rates (% compounded)* 
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Figure 6. Net trading gains (TL quadrillion) 
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Clearly though, it seems that it is no longer possible to achieve this level of profitability from investing 
in government securities. Macroeconomic stability appears to have been relatively restored with real 
rates having come down to some 12% and banks being forced to change their asset composition 
toward loans, as revealed by the sharp growth in consumer loans (Figure 7). With macroeconomic 
stability gaining ground, real rates should decline further, but gains comparable to last year are 
arguably one-off. (In fact, real rates have slightly risen again since April, attesting to a volatile year 
that the sector will have to live through.) 
 
Figure 7. Consumer credit by private banks 
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As for the capital adequacy of the sector, there is clearly a significant improvement since the May 
2001 rehabilitation programme and the sector appears to be very well-capitalised (see Table 5). Taking 
private banks, for instance, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has improved further from 19.6% in 2002 
to 23.5% last year, which is much higher than the CAR for leading banks in Europe and North 
America. Obviously, this reflects the large share of government securities (with a zero risk-weighting) 
in bank assets and a change in the composition of bank assets in favour of loans to the private sector 
(with a 100% risk weight) would lower CARs. For example, if private banks increased their loan share THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 13 
 
from 33% to 50% of total assets (offset by a reduction in government securities) the CAR would 
decline from 23% to 15%. This is a substantial drop, but nevertheless still in line with the CARs of 
leading international banks. Should such a dramatic change in the asset composition occur as assets 
expand, banks will need additional capital. Improved earnings contribute to increased reserves and, 
combined with a much-improved balance-sheet quality, make it easier to raise fresh capital from the 
market. 
3.2  ISE-listed banks: A closer look at the financial indicators 
A closer look at the ISE-listed banks’ financial indicators provides a better picture. After all, these 
nine banks, which include the ‘Top-4’ and make up 85% of private bank assets (Tables 7 through 9), 
are those that have the highest chance of adapting to a more challenging environment. 
Table 7. ISE banks’ balance sheet items 
 Assets  Loans  Securities  Deposits  Equity  Net  earnings 
  as a % of  as a % of  as a % of  as a % of  as a % of  as a % of 
 2003 TBS 2003 TBS 2003 TBS 2003 TBS 2003 TBS 2003 TBS
Akbank  29.5 20.7  8.7 19.0 14.1 27.4 19.1 21.7 5.0 24.1  1.3 45.4
Iş  Bankasi  31.1 21.8  8.6 18.7 11.8 23.0 19.6 22.2 5.6 26.8  0.4 14.5
Garanti  Bankasi  22.4 15.7  6.9 15.0 9.5 18.5 14.4 16.3 2.5 11.7  0.3 10.3
Yapi  Kredi  20.9 14.7  8.0 17.4 5.1 9.8 13.4 15.2 3.5 16.8  0.2 5.6
Diş  Bank  5.2 3.7 2.0 4.4 1.4 2.8 2.7 3.1 0.9 4.2 0.2 5.9
Finansbank  5.7 4.0 2.6 5.7 1.7 3.3 3.6 4.1 0.8 3.7 0.2 5.2
TEB  2.8 2.0 1.2 2.5 0.1 0.2 2.0 2.2 0.3 1.6 0.1 1.7
Şekerbank  2.5 1.8 0.7 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 2.0
Tekstilbank  1.2 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2
TBS (private)  142.3 85.3 45.8 85.7 51.5 87.4 88.2 88.0 20.9 90.4  2.9 90.9
Sources: Istanbul Stock Exchange and authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 8. Selected items from income statements of ISE-listed banks (2003) (in trillions of TL) 
 Ak  Is  Garanti YKB  Dis  Finans TEB  Seker  Tekstil Total 
Net  earnings  1,325  423 302 162  172  153  51 59  6 2,653 
Interest  revenues  3,736 3,665 2,101 2,498 620  754  325 417  149 14,264
o/w:  Credits  977  1,601 1,074 1,520 279  403  178 210  92  6,334 
Money  market  transactions  311  48 9 11  79  7  87  0 0  553 
Securities 2,354  1,848  886  853  206  313  24  178  49  6,710 
Interest  expenses  2,003 2,570 2,045 2,567 382  470  188 350  113 10,688
Net interest income  1,733  1,095  56  -69  238  285  137  67  35  3,576 
Net  trading  gains  1,726  900 713 480  137  155  53  106 21 4,292 
Net capital market 
transactions gains  1,349  670 558 451  152  0  41 64  27 3,312 
Net F/X transactions gains  378  230  155  29  -15  155  11  42  -6  980 
Net earnings as % of TBS 
(private banks)  45.4 14.5 10.3  5.6  5.9  5.2 1.7 2.0  0.2  90.9 
Sources: Istanbul Stock Exchange and authors’ calculations. 14 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
Table 9. Performance of ISE-listed banks 2002-03 
  ROA (%)  ROE (%)  NPL ratio (%)  Free capital 
(quad. TL)  Loans/deposits 
 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
Akbank  4.5 2.8  26.3 21.1 0.0 0.0 4.1 2.8 0.5 0.4
Iş  Bankasi  1.4 0.5 7.5 2.9 0.0 9.6 0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.4
Garanti  Bankasi  1.3 0.6  12.3 7.3 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 0.5 0.4
Yapi  Kredi  0.8 5.9 4.6 40.2 2.3 3.5 -0.5 -1.0 0.6 0.5
Diş  Bank  3.3 2.1  19.6 14.4 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.6
Finansbank  2.7 3.8  19.9 35.2 0.0 3.9 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.5
TEB  1.8 0.8  15.6 7.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5
Şekerbank  2.3 0.5  33.4 10.0 18.4 23.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3
Tekstilbank  0.5 5.4 5.4 61.8 0.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4
Sources: Istanbul Stock Exchange and authors’ calculations. 
 
As for return on assets (ROA), with the exception of one bank that has been suffering from a large 
non-performing loan ratio in its balance sheet, the banks have acceptable ratios. In the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, only so-called ‘green field’ foreign banks and privatised 
banks tend to have ROA ratios greater than 1% (foreign banks have 2.2% and privatised banks have 
1.7%) (Bonin et al., 2004). Return on equity is quite high for Akbank and Finansbank, and is 
acceptable for other banks, especially in light of the fact that these are inflation-adjusted figures. The 
problem however is that when ratios are calculated excluding the trading gains of 2003, which are 
unlikely to be repeated in the future, both ratios decline. This decline is especially dramatic for Yapi 
Kredi and Finansbank.  
Another not so favourable piece of news concerns ‘free capital’, which would appear very important in 
Turkey’s volatile financial environment. We calculated free capital for illustrative purposes by 
deducting NPLs net of provisions, subsidiaries, participations and fixed assets (land, buildings, etc.) 
from total equity (there is no standard definition of free capital). As Table 9 above shows, only 
Akbank has significant free capital; Isbank has negligible free capital and Garanti and Yapi Kredi have 
negative free capital. 
4.  Obstacles to sound banking 
Despite a much-improved regulatory framework and a leaner environment, a ‘take off’ in the sector 
nevertheless seems hindered by a number of complicating factors. These factors can be classified into 
four broad categories, which include (roughly in order of importance) macroeconomic stability, the 
dominant role of state banks, the status of the loan portfolios and heavy taxation of the sector.
 9 A fifth 
problem that has adversely affected the soundness of the sector – the ‘blanket deposit guarantee’ – is 
now terminated, with the coverage having been reduced to EU-comparable levels as of July this year.
10 
                                                 
9 These factors were partly identified through interviews with a number of bank executives. See Annex 2 for the 
questionnaire used in these interviews. For an evaluation by the EU of the progress achieved by the TBS and 
remaining pitfalls see Annex 3 and European Commission (2001, 2002 and 2003).  
10 Before we move to other factors, a brief historical background on the deposit guarantee system may be 
helpful. The blanket deposit guarantee has been around for ten years and caused much ‘moral hazard’ on the part 
of depositors and distortion in the sector, but at the same time it may have helped to prevent wide-scale ‘bank 
runs’ – a phenomenon never observed in Turkey despite the many financial crises the country underwent. The 
blanket state guarantee was first introduced to ward off the 1994 currency crisis. Though the initial plan was to 
phase out the unlimited guarantee once the situation normalised, the temporary policy turned into a permanent THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 15 
 
4.1 Macroeconomic  instability 
As we have noted in section 2, chronic macroeconomic instability and the resulting high real interest 
rates are possibly among the key factors that curtailed the development of financial intermediation in 
Turkey. High real interest rates could discourage financial intermediation at least in two ways, through 
what one could call ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ channels: the direct channel would work as high and volatile 
real interest rates discourage both demand for credit (through uncertainty) and its supply (through 
crowding out). The indirect channel would work through diverting talent away from productive and 
core banking activities to Treasury operations. Any observer of the Turkish economy would agree that 
the 1990s were profoundly characterised by these tendencies, with low growth, poor income 
distribution and a large informal economy keeping the economy far below its potential. In light of 
recent academic research, which appears to have established a strong connection between good 
finance and general economic growth, one could argue that strong financial intermediation is not only 
key to economic growth going forward, but was also a contributor to Turkey’s unimpressive growth 
rate in recent years (see Box 2).  
 
Box 2. Financial sector development and growth 
During the last 15 years the economic literature has both theoretically and empirically been able to 
demonstrate a strong relationship between economic growth and financial sector development. In King & 
Levine (1993), four financial indicators are added to a standard modern growth model. The control variables 
are initial income, initial secondary school enrolment, the ratio of trade to GDP, the ratio of government 
spending to GDP and average inflation. The four financial indicators are financial depth (broad money/GDP), 
the importance of banks relative to the central bank (the ratio of deposit-money banks’ domestic assets to 
deposit-money banks’ domestic assets plus central-bank domestic assets), the share of credit to the non-
financial private sector in total credit and the ratio of credit to the non-financial private sector to GDP. They 
used a large sample of 80 developing and developed countries. 
For the long period (1960-90) examined by King & Levine (1993), higher per capital growth is associated 
with higher levels of financial development, that is, the indicators tend to rise with higher economic growth. 
Their regressions not only find statistically significant contemporaneous correlations between all four 
financial indicators and per capita growth, capital accumulation and a measure of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, but also find significant correlations between initial levels of financial development and 
subsequent economic growth, capital accumulation and TFP growth. In the cross-sectional study by Levine, 
Loayza & Beck (2000), the causality between financial development and economic growth was analysed. The 
results support the hypothesis that economic growth is at least partly explained by the effect of the exogenous 
components of financial development. (See also IMF, 2004, for a nice overview of this literature, as well as 
Demetriades & Andrianova, 2003).  
In a study of Russia, Beck (2004) applied these results and simulated the loss in economic growth owing to an 
underdeveloped financial sector. He simulated three scenarios: first, what would have happened to growth if 
the financial sector had been able to maintain its progress until 1998 beyond that date? Second, what would 
have happened to growth if Russia had been able to bring its financial sector development to the average level 
achieved in Hungary and Poland? And third, what would have happened if Russia had been able to bring its 
financial sector development to the level achieved by the top performers in the King & Levine sample? The 
                                                                                                                                                          
one. The moral hazard this created is generally considered to be the main reason why many private banks, which 
ended up at the SDIF, took those risks. In July 2000, as part of the disinflation program, the coalition 
government started to phase out the blanket guarantee, by lowering the ceiling to TL100 billion (more than US 
$150,000 at the prevailing exchange rate). The blanket guarantee was re-introduced six months later in 
December 2000 during the liquidity crisis. During the collapse of Imar Bank in July 2003, the BRSA said it 
would adhere to the blanket guarantee, but that it would reduce the coverage to deposits that are below TL 
50,000 billion (around €30,000) by July 2004, which was executed as planned. This ceiling is broadly in line 
with the deposit guarantee in EU countries, whereby the level of deposit protection varies between €20,000 and 
€60,000, but is a bit high for Turkey, given that its average income per capita is about one-fifth of that in the EU. 
The ceiling covers over 90% of the accounts by the number of accounts, but only about 60% by the size of 
accounts. 16 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
results are suggestive. Under the first scenario the Russian growth rate during 1998–2002 (in the absence of a 
crisis) would have been 1 percentage point higher every year. Under the second scenario (Russia reaches 
average Polish and Hungarian financial development by 2002), the growth rate would have been higher by 6.9 
to 8.1 percentage points. The third simulation, which is admittedly unrealistic, suggests a 52-61 percentage 
point higher average annual growth rate.  
If we take the fourth indicator for Turkey, that is, the ratio of credit to the non-financial private sector/GDP, 
which stood in 2003 at 18% and compares to an average of Poland and Hungary of 30%, we can repeat the 
exercise by asking what would happen to real growth in Turkey if this ratio was increased by 10 percentage 
points to come close to the level in Hungary and Poland? As the relationship is non-linear (variables are in 
log) the very low starting point of Turkey will have a much larger impact than, say, a 10 percentage point 
improvement for Hungary or Poland. With a growth coefficient of 0.028, the King & Levine results suggest 
that Turkey’s growth rate would improve by 2 percentage points annually on average. Although not very 
precise, this is a strongly suggestive result. There are not many other policy options that can promise such an 
impact on growth. 
Turkey’s growth over the last few decades was unimpressive for a developing country that is supposed to 
catch up. The financial literature suggests that an underdeveloped financial sector is partly the result of overall 
economic development and partly the cause of volatile and modest average growth. In this view financial 
reforms are urgently needed and, even if resistance has to be overcome, this effort is worth the trouble. (See 
BRSA, 2003, which puts forward the conjecture that Turkey should be able to grow faster as financial 
taxation declines and with it deepening in the sector increases).  
4.2  The large share of state-owned banks 
As noted in section 2, state-owned banks make up a large segment of the Turkish banking sector 
(about 42% of total deposits and some 20% of total loans). Although such high ratios are observed in 
advanced EU countries such as Germany, no accession country has a state bank share close to 
Turkey’s.  
State banks were the main contributor to the latest crisis. Subsequent to the crisis, the state banks 
(Ziraat, Halk and Emlak) have gone through successful operational restructuring as part of the banking 
sector reform programme (e.g., the merger of Emlak with Ziraat and the appointment of a joint 
management board; the downsizing of branches and employment; and the passing of legislation 
preventing ‘duty loses’). But now the next phase of reform is marred by uncertainties, and the 
government (at least until now) has provided mixed signals regarding its intentions.
11 One reason 
could be that Turkey privatised a number of state banks in the mid-1990s, but experience has not been 
particularly encouraging as most of these banks were among the first to be taken over by the SDIF 
during the crises years (e.g., Sumerbank). 
Regardless of the government’s intentions and fair concerns regarding the privatisations of state banks, 
the presence of these banks adversely affects the smooth functioning of the banking sector in a number 
of ways. For one thing, following the imposition of a ceiling on the government guarantee on deposits, 
state banks continue to be perceived as having an ‘implicit’ blanket guarantee. This may lead to a 
migration of deposits, especially large TL deposits from private to state banks,
12 putting private banks 
– no matter how financially sound – at a competitive disadvantage.  
Second, though state banks have arguably a few strengths (such as the franchise with SMEs and 
farmers or loyal depositors), weaknesses such as infrastructure, staff quality and ability to compete 
                                                 
11 Numerous examples of these mixed signals can be found in the local press. Another interesting issue is the 
recent attempts by the Turkish post office to obtain approval from the BRSA to offer banking services, which 
appear to contradict the broader objective of reducing the role of the public sector in banking. 
12 As of 20 February, state banks had 42% of all deposits, but 57% of TL deposits and only 24% of foreign 
currency deposits. They have only 21% of total loans, so loan migration and certain products (F/X deposits) are 
unlikely to pose a problem. THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 17 
 
with private banks in terms of service quality and innovation seem to overpower the strengths by far.
13 
Consequently, there is currently discussion on the possible strategy for state banks and the 
government’s intentions. Banking sources (mainly representing private banks) sound pessimistic that 
state banks can be privatised – and they propose instead that state banks be reduced in size and stick to 
their original public functions. This strategy, in their view, would prevent the state banks from 
distorting the market. In order to continue with their function of agricultural- and SME-lending, they 
need not continue as universal banks with a deposit-taking license. The counter argument to 
privatisation, expressed by the current management of Ziraat and Halk, asserts that no potential buyers 
would be interested in the state banks as they are and therefore they must first improve their results as 
commercial banks and then be put up for sale. The recent forays of these banks into consumer 
products, especially into the credit card business should be interpreted in this context. 
Finally, state banks hold a monopoly on banking with state enterprises and foundations in Turkey, 
which are barred from opening an account with private banks and can only bank with state banks. This 
practice gives state banks a complete monopoly on the cash management of state enterprises and 
foundations. Arguably, the practice also deprives this captive customer base from using the more 
advanced financial products offered by private and foreign banks. In addition, according to industry 
sources, state banks have also continued the habit of bidding up interest rates on TL deposits (offering 
higher rates than large private banks) to maintain their market share. These two factors partly explain 
their dominance in Turkish lira deposits. 
4.3  State of the loan portfolio and limits to growth potential 
With regard to the loan portfolio, the banking system appears to be faced with two key problems. First, 
although the problem is much smaller than in the comparator countries that went through similar 
financial crises, there are aspects of the non-performing loans in Turkey that still have to be tackled. 
They still make up a relatively sizeable portion of the loan portfolio and hamper growth. Second, 
regardless of the NPL problem, the growth potential of the loan portfolio appears limited in the very 
near term, which emerges as a key obstacle to growth and profitability, and enhances macroeconomic 
risks. 
4.3.1  Non-performing loans and the status of the loan portfolio 
Immediately after the 2001 crisis, the BRSA had to cope with three types of NPL problems, which had 
almost reached one-third of the total loan portfolio (Table 10): the connected-lending practices of 
numerous private banks that became insolvent and were taken over by the SDIF; the NPLs of state-
owned banks, which had to be fully provisioned for using public funds; and the better-managed private 
banks, which saw an increase in NPLs as a result of the deteriorating economy and hence needed some 
sort of a debt-workout mechanism. 
As the total loan portfolio was relatively small compared to both total assets and GDP, NPL growth 
was not the major source of the banking crisis as was the case, for instance, in Asian economies during 
1997-98 crisis. Nevertheless, NPLs accounted for close to half of the restructuring costs. The problem 
had been concentrated in two segments of the sector: private banks transferred to the SDIF and state-
owned banks. The former was mainly owing to connected lending to the controlling shareholders of 
the banks.
14 The portion of this restructuring cost from non-performing loans extended to companies 
                                                 
13 In fact, McKinsey (2003) finds that state banks are a key drag on productivity in the sector (see p. 212). 
14 Connected lending has traditionally been a major problem of the TBS. Prior to the 2001 crisis, the problem 
had been aggravated by both the weak enforcement of the regulations and by legal loopholes, which allowed the 
controlling shareholders to lend to their non-financial businesses without exceeding the legal lending limits. 
Treasury auditors had been aware of the over-lending to subsidiaries or affiliated companies. Some bank 
shareholders infamously invested in new ventures where the only lender was the owner’s bank. In addition, 
shareholders used cross-holdings, relatives and friends, etc. to further their interests. By the late 1990s, the 
problem had reached proportions that constituted a systemic risk to the sector as a whole.  18 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
controlled by the majority shareholders of these banks was $11 billion. (Of this amount, $9 billion was 
lent directly from the bank to the shareholders and another $2 billion came from other banks that 
ended up with the SDIF, collateralised by the owner’s bank). The problem of NPLs in state banks was 
mainly the result of politically motivated lending. Both had little to do with the drastic contraction of 
the economy in 2001. The private NPL portfolio rose to 28% of total loans in 2001, a very high figure 
by international standards. 
Table 10. NPL ratio and provisions in the Turkish banking sector 
  NPL ratio (%)  Provision/NPL (%) 
 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 
State banks  37.3 37.4 26.2 62.7 73.9 97.6 
Private banks  27.6 8.9 6.5 31.5 53.0 80 
Foreign banks  5.5 4.9 4.3 75.6 77.7 78.5 
Investment banks  10.7 4.0 3.5 82.3 64.2 90.3 
SDIF banks  67.3 69.4 53.8 55.9 60.5 75.4 
Total 29.3 17.6 11.5 47.1 64.2 88.5 
Sources: BRSA Annual Report 2003 and authors’ calculations. 
The restructuring programme tackled the state and SDIF banks. There has not been a significant 
improvement in the NPL portfolio of state banks, but with the help of recapitalisation, they are now 
well provisioned. Prior to the restructuring, state banks had mainly been financing the Treasury and 
commercial loans had not been a substantial part of their activity. The bulk of lending consisted of 
politically motivated lending to companies or groups, which did not and could not have access to 
private-sector credit, because of their low level of creditworthiness.  
Asset collections from former owners, or more generally, asset resolutions have gone fairly slowly 
until now, but there has been some progress of late. First, the SDIF has signed long-term repayment 
agreements with controlling shareholders of a number of banks for a total of about $3.5 billion.
15 
Second, to improve enforcement SDIF was separated from BRSA, as of January this year (see Box 3). 
Finally, SDIF started to auction bad loans of banks taken over, as part of the IMF programme. 
Box 3. Whither the ‘Istanbul Approach’? 
For resolution of the NPLs of private banks, the Bank Association of Turkey, with the approval and support of 
the BRSA, initiated the Financial Restructuring Framework Agreements to work out the corporate debt 
problem. The platform was named the ‘Istanbul Approach’ (after the London Approach of the 1970s, where 
banks and corporates gathered under the auspices of the Bank of England). Initially, progress was slow largely 
reflecting difficulties in pulling banks with conflicting interests around a unified framework, but eventually 25 
banks and 17 non-bank financial institutions signed the agreement. The initial understanding was that private 
banks, in return for restructuring their creditors’ debt, would be able remove the NPLs from their balance 
sheets and international institutions would provide some of the financing required. The plan did not quite 
develop in this direction. In general, results have been mixed, the key problem being that the Istanbul 
Approach essentially evolved into a platform of postponing rather than restructuring debt. That the private 
banks have not received any support also contributed to this outcome, and they now carry the restructured 
loans on their balance sheet. (They have only been provided an exemption from provisioning requirements for 
loans restructured within the Istanbul Approach.) 
                                                 
15 Excluding the latest Cukurova deal, signed in early August 2004. Banking Law changed to take legal action to 
seize personal assets of SDIF banks’ former shareholders. The first implementation was the seizure of the assets 
of The Uzan family in February 2004, while most SDIF banks were provided with a gradual compliance plan. As 
explained in Box I above, the latest round of revisions to the Banking Act that are underway, are seeking to 
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The total loans brought under the Istanbul Approach platform for ‘restructuring’ as of October 2003 (BRSA, 
2003b) is provided in the table below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In another attempt to tackle the NPL problem, asset management companies, which would take over the bad 
loans of the TBS, could develop as another method. Despite legislation and regulations being finalised in 
2002, no asset management companies have been established yet. 
In summary, the NPL problems of the TBS, after provisioning and after two years of high growth, have come 
down to manageable levels. Private banks’ NPL/loan ratio in August 2003 stood at 9.4%, with more than half 
provisioned for. We can assume that NPLs no longer pose a threat to the stability of the system. Nevertheless, 
they are high enough to discourage lending and act as a brake to further loan growth. (A coordination 
committee that was to be established under the Treasury to facilitate and monitor the corporate debt 
restructuring process as well as identify and propose the removal of impediments never took off.) 
 
4.3.2  Looking forward: Growth potential of the loan portfolio 
The credit demand in Turkey is derived from three segments: large corporates, SMEs and consumers. 
The TBS currently faces different problems in profitably expanding in all three segments. Large 
corporates have never experienced any problems in terms of access to credit. In the completely 
liberalised financial environment of the Turkish economy, not only domestic banks, but also foreign 
banks (with or without a local presence) have been willing to lend to Turkish corporates with good 
credit standing. In other words, lending to corporates has been a ‘borrower’s market’. Consequently, 
spreads in this segment have reportedly declined to breakeven levels, with the implication that, short 
of a pick up in growth, there seems to be little room for further loan growth in this fiercely competitive 
segment. 
The SMEs on the other hand have been notoriously underserved, which seems to be explained by a 
combination of demand and supply-side factors. Even for Halkbank, which is the state bank with the 
designated mission of lending to SMEs, the loans/total assets ratio is less than 10% (2002 figures). 
One reason is that SMEs have not enjoyed a comfortable relationship with private banks, which in the 
past have tried to expand into SMEs as a target market-segment. During the extremely volatile 
macroeconomic environment in the last decade, however, at the very first sign of a liquidity problem, 
banks either called in SME loans before maturity or increased interest rates on the existing loans 
drastically. This practice was repeated in 1994, 1999 and 2001, and created a problem of trust between 
SMEs and private banks, which subsequently started counting on equity finance for expansion. Under 
the current more stable macro-environment, the trust between the SMEs and the TBS is likely to be 
restored, but this will take time.  
On the supply side, banks face a problem of evaluating SME creditworthiness and overcoming the 
asymmetric information problem faced by all banks in dealing with SMEs. In many sectors where 
SMEs dominate, non-registered transactions are the norm and the actual activity level of the 
prospective borrower is rarely reflected on the financial statements. This makes it difficult to make 
valid credit decisions about SMEs. This problem is especially great for foreign banks, which have to 
comply with their global credit practices.
16 In more developed markets most of the lending to SMEs is 
                                                 
16 A key drawback for SMEs would appear to be ‘being informal’.  
Debt restructuring within the Istanbul Approach 
 Number  of  debtors  Total restructured debt 
($ million) 
Large corporates  20  4,561 
SMEs 69  555 
Total 89  5,116 20 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
secured by mortgages and pledges on property (merchandise, machinery, trucks, cars, ships, etc.) or 
revenue streams. To boost lending to SMEs, the legal instruments first need to be created.  
Given these problems with lending to enterprises, be it blue chip or SME, the third segment, retail 
lending, becomes the only possible loan growth area. One problem though is that this is a relatively 
new area for the TBS, the first one of which ended in tears. The first consumer-lending boom in recent 
history took place in 2000, which ended in the 2001 crisis. Banks started to lend again to consumers in 
late 2003 and total consumer loans (including car and house loans) tripled, restoring its share in total 
loans to the pre-crisis levels of 15%. Although growth is still slow, little is known about the 
effectiveness of growth in this area.  
At the end of 2003 there were 2.5 million consumer loan contracts outstanding. In a country with an 
estimated 15 million households, this figure may indicate that there is a lot of room for growth. Yet 
industry sources assert that this represents the bankable population of Turkey at the moment. The 
remaining majority of the population does not demand banking products, including loans. The reasons 
frequently cited are low levels of per capita income in the lower income levels, unequal distribution of 
income, the relatively recent history of urbanisation and low levels of education. At any rate, in a 
country with a notorious current account deficit owing to an insufficient level of domestic savings, a 
strong growth of consumer lending would not be desirable, at least as long as the government still runs 
a sizeable deficit. Should consumer lending develop strongly the government may even wish to curb it 
with a tax.  
A further constraint on the supply of loans is the method of calculating capital adequacy ratios in line 
with the original Basle criteria. The current criteria assign a zero risk-weighting to sovereign debt 
instruments, whereas loans to the private sector have a positive risk-weighting. If the composition of 
assets were to change towards a larger share of loans, this would lower the capital adequacy ratios 
automatically.  
4.4 Heavy  taxation of the sector 
The heavy taxation of the financial sector has received much attention in the past two years. A 
working group has been formed at the BRSA, with a view to analysing the problem and formulating 
recommendations. The large business association, TUSIAD, and the Banks Association also 
formulated their proposals in this connection. In a comprehensive and carefully prepared report, 
BRSA shows that for 2002, various taxes and fees on financial intermediation (including reserve 
requirements) raised the cost of TL-credit by over 50% (Figure 8) and about as much for foreign-
exchange denominated loans.
17 The study finds that some 85% of these costs are passed on to the 
consumer. 
Heavy taxation, like all excessive taxation, causes two problems: it creates a form of ‘financial 
repression’ by way of overburdening the sector and impeding its growth; it also causes the migration 
of financial intermediation abroad in a liberalised capital account. Evidence of the latter is two fold – 
the high level of non-financial private sector external debt ($27.5 billion at the end of 2003) and the 
ratio of credits extended through foreign branches and subsidiaries of local banks to total credit, which 
stands at some 40%. In other words, the TBS has reacted to heavy taxation with the migration of both 
deposits and loans to subsidiaries or branches abroad. Almost every Turkish private bank worth its 
name has established a subsidiary bank in Europe, with the Netherlands as the favoured location. As of 
the end of 2002, 40% of all loans by Turkish banks had been booked offshore, mainly to companies 
domiciled in Turkey. International branches and affiliates accounted for 22% of total assets and 16% 
of deposits. The asset and liability migration initially created a supervision problem as the 
international subsidiaries were outside the jurisdiction of Turkish regulatory authorities. This problem 
                                                 
17 Figure 8 was reproduced from a BRSA study. It builds up the cost of numerous taxes and fees from the net 
interest stage (paid to depositor) to the lending phase, including (net) required reserves – i.e., required reserves 
held by banks, adjusted for the remuneration they receive at money market rates. THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 21 
 
has now been solved by the BRSA auditing the international subsidiaries and branches along with the 
production of financial statements, consolidating these subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the burden 
continues on the TBS in the sense of allocating capital and resources to these subsidiaries.
18 
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5.  Efficiency, productivity and competitiveness  
In this section, we take up a fourth angle in assessing the readiness of the TBS for EU integration, and 
explore issues of productivity, efficiency and competitiveness. Admittedly, this is a very broad and 
data-demanding area, and a thorough examination goes beyond the scope of this paper.
19 Instead, we 
do three things: we look at a few broad indicators of efficiency, summarise the findings of a 
comprehensive productivity study by the consulting group McKinsey on retail banking and share some 
anecdotal evidence on the competitiveness of Turkish banks in the current environment. 
We conclude that the record is somewhat mixed. Despite weak ‘financial intermediation’ and 
excessive reliance on government securities, Turkish private banks come across as relatively advanced 
as retail franchises.
20 They have made large investments in IT infrastructure and exploited the 
efficiency gains offered by alternative distribution channels. Internet-based and telephone banking 
have become standard options, with an increasing proportion of transactions moving to these channels 
from the traditional branch network. Most of the banking executives we interviewed were of the 
opinion that private Turkish banks are as advanced as any bank in the EU with regard to retail 
banking, and that given the skilled resources they employ, they were capable of developing and 
maintaining this level of service. This would appear to be an important asset as Turkey prepares to 
enter a common market for financial services, as called for by the EU’s Second Banking Directive.  
                                                 
18 In 2002, fiscal revenue from this taxation amounted to about 3% of GDP; meanwhile, with declining interest 
rates, total fiscal revenue from the financial sector appeared to have been halved in 2003, and simulations 
suggest that it would have dropped to about 0.5% of GDP should the interest rate declined to European levels of 
around 10%. Tax “rate” would decline as well, although still remain significant at almost 40% even at 10% 
interest rate. 
19 The terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘productivity’ for our purposes are very close to each other – essentially, 
productivity is a measure of economic efficiency, which shows how effectively economic inputs are converted 
into output. On the other hand, competitiveness is, by definition, a relative position, but arguably it also boils 
down to productivity/efficiency. 
20 State banks suffer from low-skilled human resources, an underutilised IT infrastructure and a lethargic service 
level, typical of many state-owned enterprises. 22 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
But all is not well. As a McKinsey study shows, the sector seems to suffer from low levels of 
productivity compared with both the benchmark country (the US) and its own potential, while our 
simple, illustrative indicators suggest that efficiency gains in the sector are a recent phenomenon. 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that Turkish banks are already suffering from competition, 
with heavy taxation being a major drawback.  
5.1  Measuring efficiency through illustrative indicators 
There is little doubt that compared with the 1990s, the TBS is now much leaner in terms of standard 
efficiency measures such as deposits and assets per employee and per branch. Perhaps the most 
striking statistic is that, despite the tripling in both deposits and assets in the 1990-2003 period, the 
total numbers of employees and branches are now lower than they were at the beginning of the last 
decade (Table 11). Specifically, the sector employed 154,000 staff in 6,500 branches in 1990; it now 
employs 123,000 staff in 6,000 branches. The numbers peaked in 2000 with 170,000 staff and 7,800 
branches, then declined rapidly. The productivity gains were achieved in the post-crisis 2001-03 
period during which personnel numbers declined by 28% and branch numbers by 24%.  
Table 11. Efficiency indicators 
 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003
Deposits ($ billion)  32.5 43.5 89.1 101.6 81.2 86.9  111.2
Assets ($ billion)  58.1 67.0 133.2 154.6 115.3 129.8  178.8
Deposits/assets (%)  56 65 67 66 70 67  62
Deposits/branch ($ million)  5.0 7.0 11.6 13.0 11.7 14.2  18.6
Deposits/employee ($ million)  0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7  0.9
Employee/branch 23.5 23.2 22.6 21.7 19.9 20.2  20.7
Assets/employee ($ thousand)  377 463 766 907 839 1,053  1,451
Assets/branch ($ thousand)  8,859 10,739 17,320 19,724 16,692 21,259  29,967
Sources: TBA, BRSA and authors’ calculations. 
In terms of branch density, Turkey has nine branches for every 100,000 persons (a common measure 
of branch density). Among the EU members, Germany has 60 branches and the UK, Finland and 
Sweden have less than 25. Among the new members Poland has 6 and Hungary has 11. Employees per 
branch now stand at 21 and assets per branch at about $30 million. Assets per employee, which were 
less than $400,000 in 1990, are now nearly $1.5 million. In Poland assets per employee are $0.8 
million and in Hungary these total $1.5 million. Contrary to what may be expected, the productivity 
figures of state banks are in line with those of private banks, possibly reflecting the favourable impact 
of restructuring during 2001-02. 
The improvement in the productivity figures of the sector was mainly the result of restructuring of 
state banks and the liquidation of the SDIF banks. The survivors also improved their productivity 
through an emphasis on alternative delivery channels. No data are available, but industry sources 
assert that nearly half of all the transactions of large private banks take place through telephone and 
online banking. In terms of non-interest costs, Turkey’s four largest banks compare favourably with 
the transition economies. Their ‘non-interest cost/total asset’ ratio ranged between 3.4% and 4.6% in 
2003. For the transition economies, the ratio ranged between 10% for green field foreign banks (the 
lowest) and 18% for state banks (the highest). 
In terms of the most common measure of bank efficiency, the operating cost-income ratio, three of the 
four largest Turkish banks had a good ratio, in the 30-70% range. The EU average is 61%. Only Yapı 
Kredi, with a 95% ratio, appears to be ‘inefficient’ by this criterion. Given that 2003 was a year when THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR | 23 
 
one-off trading results had a big impact on bank earnings, one alternative is to normalise by excluding 
trading gains. Then, only Akbank and Isbank appear to fall in the acceptable range of efficiency.  
Under conditions of high interest-rate volatility, the stability of a bank’s earnings depends to a large 
extent on the income from commissions and fees for the banking services they provide. Historically, 
with the high interest margin earned from investments in government securities, Turkish banks have 
subsidised other banking business by offering zero-fee transactions to gain market share. This practice 
has been discontinued and fees and commissions have started to contribute to the ‘bottom line’. The 
weighted average (i.e., weighted with assets) commission was 1.4% in 2003. This was in line with 
ratios in transition economies, from a low of 1.3% for state banks to 1.9% for privatised banks. The 
bulk of commission income is from the consumer business, mainly from credit cards and asset 
management fees. 
5.2  An overall productivity assessment: The McKinsey study 
Measuring productivity, defined essentially as output per unit of input(s), is clearly a difficult exercise 
in the absence of homogenous inputs and outputs, requiring a clear methodology and much data 
gathering. Luckily, as part of a recent comprehensive study on Turkish productivity, the consulting 
group McKinsey examines the productivity levels in the retail-banking sector as one of the 13 sectors 
(McKinsey, 2003).
21 The study concludes that Turkey has a long way to go in terms of matching the 
productivity level of the benchmark country (the US) as well as its own potential. Specifically, it finds 
that labour productivity in the TBS is only 42% of the benchmark US case, and some 46 percentage 
points below its own potential (which the study calculates is 88% of the US). 
The study takes a production function approach to the calculation of labour productivity, whereby 
three main categories – payment transactions, deposit accounts and loans – are considered as physical 
outputs and their relevant employment figures as inputs.
22 The analysis finds the “organization of 
functions and tasks” (OFT) in the “payment transactions” category, as the biggest operational 
contributor to the productivity gap (see Exhibit 4 on p. 199 in McKinsey, 2003). (Other contributors to 
the productivity gap include capital intensity/technology, scale, capacity utilisation and customer 
demographics and behaviour, with relatively smaller contributions from these categories except 
perhaps for customer demographics and behaviour.) This, in turn, is explained by a payment mix 
dominated by labour intensive, branch-level transactions, with the latter accounting for 46% of all 
payment transactions (compared to 3% in the US and 7% in the Netherlands). Although OFT-related 
weaknesses are common to all banks, the study finds that state banks have two additional challenges: 
the infrastructure for ‘alternative delivery channels’, and branch design and practices. In fact, low 
productivity levels in state banks explain 21 percentage points of the 46 percentage point gap between 
the TBS’s current and potential productivity levels. Just aligning their operational efficiency with that 
of private banks, the study finds, would improve overall productivity by 8 percentage points. 
The analysis comes up with three recommendations for policy-makers (two related to state banks 
alone). One is relevant for the entire banking sector – the introduction of productivity-related 
performance measures into state banks; the other two involve removing state banks’ unfair advantages 
by levelling the playing field and creating the enabling legislation that encompasses the promotion of 
alternative delivery channels and improves efficiency in loan application processes. 
5.3 Sectoral  competitiveness 
The TBS is clearly at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis international banks in meeting the demands 
of large Turkish corporates, especially in terms of capital market products. The frequent crises and the 
                                                 
21 This is by far the most comprehensive productivity study on Turkey that we are aware of, whereby the 
standard McKinsey Global Institute methodology is employed to measure productivity. 
22 See the appendix to the McKinsey (2003) chapter on p. 219 for an exact description of the methodology used 
on the measurement of labour productivity. 24 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
short-term outlook of the TBS developed under the volatile macro-conditions of the past decade left 
only a few tools in their arsenal. Under an open capital account, large Turkish corporates with 
increasingly international businesses have turned to foreign banks and started using financial products 
that were not available to them locally. Anecdotal evidence abounds that Turkish corporates give only 
their most ‘mundane businesses’ to the TBS. On the other hand, a wide spectrum of more 
sophisticated tasks with higher profit margins, ranging from Vestel’s asset-backed bond issue in 
international markets to Eregli Demir Celik’s long-term investment finance syndicated loan, were all 
arranged by foreign banks.  
Local banks have so far managed to serve the other two segments of the customer base, the SMEs and 
consumers. The decade-old experience of the only foreign bank to venture into the local consumer 
business suggests that local knowledge still counts in the Turkish market. Their credit card, otherwise 
a valuable global brand, has under-performed in the market. 
5.4  Why has foreign bank presence been limited in Turkey? 
In the new EU member states foreign banks have been the carriers of new technological and savoir 
faire transfers. Why have foreign banks shunned Turkey? The entry of foreign banks into Turkey 
began with the financial liberalisation in the 1980s. All legal barriers to entry were gradually removed 
and the Treasury has traditionally been accommodating in granting licenses, be it to open a single 
branch or register as a full-fledged, incorporated bank in Turkey. A number of foreign banks – 
commercial banks with a deposit-taking license and investment banks – operate in Turkey at present, 
but most of them with only one branch in Istanbul. As documented in section 2, foreign banks make 
up some 5% of the sector’s assets, which is very low compared to CEE-5. 
Why has this been the case? The question is interesting, given that, as noted above, legislation is not 
an obstacle to foreign bank ownership and is arguably more liberal than in many countries that have 
received more foreign direct investment into their financial sectors.  
First, it needs to be recognised that the Central European experience is quite unique. When these 
countries opened up, they had no history of commercial banking and the most efficient option of 
quickly transforming their banking system was indeed to invite foreign banks as strategic investors. 
Second, in Central Europe geography also helped. The ‘gravity model’ not only is pertinent for trade 
flows, but also for foreign investment (Gros & Steinherr, 2004). It is doubtful that Austrian banks, for 
example, would wish to have the same presence in Turkey as in neighbouring countries. Third, even in 
well-banked EU countries the share of foreign banks is less than in Turkey: in 1999, the share of 
foreign banks was 3.3% in Austria, 7.1% in Finland, 9.8% in France, 4.3% in Germany, 6.8% in Italy, 
7.7% in the Netherlands, 10.5% in Portugal and 11.7 % in Spain (Dermine, 2003, p. 48).  
Some bank executives we interviewed argued that with the fully liberalised financial regulations of 
Turkey, a foreign bank that wants to do business with local corporates can do so with one branch, 
while others can do a lot with only one representative office.
23 Although it is not possible to support it 
with figures, it is a well-known fact that foreign banks lend a lot more to Turkish corporates than it 
appears on the balance sheet of their Turkish operations.
 24 There really is no incentive to expand the 
balance sheet in Turkey and add ‘currency risk’ in addition to the country risk they have already 
assumed. The question then becomes: Why are foreign banks not willing to expand business by 
entering the retail sector, i.e., lending to SMEs and individuals? 
                                                 
23 This is very similar in nature to what McKinsey calls the “FDI paradox”, i.e., the tendency of foreign 
participants to have a presence in Turkey but refrain from intense involvement and expansion (see p. 46 in 
McKinsey, 2003). 
24 External debt numbers show a high level of private sector indebtedness, which provides some indirect 
evidence for this, but a good chunk of this debt, as also noted above, may well be Turkish wealth abroad being 
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The answer to that question can only be speculative. Until recently, there were barriers other than 
physical legislative ones. In other words, chronic macro-instability and corrupt banking practices with 
heavy reliance on T-bill holdings resulted in inflated valuations that acted as a natural barrier to entry. 
Potential foreign acquirers felt unsure about their ability to sustain high levels of profitability in this 
environment through ‘operational excellence’ alone (McKinsey, 2003). This appears to have now 
changed, with Turkey becoming relatively more stable. 
However, it also needs to be recognised that the Turkish political and business establishment has not 
been eager to face foreign competition in domestic markets they carved up for themselves. Legal 
uncertainties, family ownership of banks, the tradition of having portfolios of industrial holdings and 
the exposure of banks to the debts of their parent groups, have made acquisition of banks in Turkey 
less attractive.  
Once a track-record of macro stability is established, and certainly when EU accession becomes a 
concrete vision of the future,  foreign bank entries will naturally follow.At any rate, he TBS will go 
inevitably through a significant consolidation in the next few years. In that connection, able 
management of this process by the BRSA would appear to be the most critical policy challenge 
looking forward. A good opportunity is provided by the more than 25 banks under administration. 
Once restructured some of them could be put up for sale to foreign banks. An encouraging example is 
the acquisition of the assets of Demirbank by HSBC.   
6.  Overall assessment and policy recommendations 
We have evaluated the TBS along several axes in this report, and our main conclusions and policy 
suggestions may be summarised as follows: 
•  First and most importantly, the macroeconomic environment will have to improve further. 
Macroeconomic stability, defined as single-digit inflation and sound public finances, is essential to 
a healthy and growth-supportive banking sector. Turkey has made major strides in this regard in 
the past few years, but the job is not finished yet. Single-digit inflation needs to be sustained, and 
public finances have some way to go before both budget deficits and public debt as a percentage 
of GNP are brought fully under control. Maintenance of macro-stability is essential, as without it 
all other achievements would be at risk. Macro-stability is particularly important given the recent 
removal of the blanket deposit guarantee.  
Also, from a macro-perspective, to support the development of the financial sector, authorities 
would be well advised to significantly reduce reserve requirements as well as other taxes on 
financial intermediation in line with general EU practice (ECB, 2003) or remunerate banks at 
market rates, i.e., fix the rate on Treasury bills to reduce the implicit tax on financial 
intermediation. As is well known, as banks manage to shift this tax onto borrowers, it acts as a 
drag on borrowing, hence on financial intermediation and investment. This is true for multitude of 
taxes and fees that suffocate the financial sector in Turkey.
25Reduction of taxes on financial 
intermediation has driven large borrowers and depositors abroad. One goal of reduced taxation 
would be to repatriate these operations and to level the playing field for entry into the European 
banking market. 
The new regulations introduced reporting on a consolidated basis. This is important as Turkish 
banks have a strong presence abroad through branches and subsidiaries. The new Turkish rules are 
compatible with the EU Second Banking Directive that makes home authorities responsible for 
solvency of foreign branches whereas host authorities are responsible for subsidiairies. (For 
liquidity rules and management host authorities are in charge). 
                                                 
25 Clearly though, these have to be achieved without endangering the fiscal and monetary policy goals of the 
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Turkey has capital account convertibility that Greece, Portugal and Spain had not yet achieved 
when they became members of the EU. The capital market is still very underdeveloped as it has 
been in those comparator countries and as is the case in the new member countries. This is a 
disadvantage for modern banking – that is, the unbundling of financial services – but rather typical 
for the present state of development. In the future greater attention needs to be addressed to the 
development of financial markets for which the regulatory environment of the EU is very 
demanding. The decision to transfer oversight of financial markets as of 1 January 2005 from the 
treasury to BRSA, underlines the government’s readiness to disentangle from its, for the Turkish 
economy, unhappy involvement in financial sectors. 
•  Second, the regulatory framework and supervision appears to be in good shape. Great progress has 
been achieved after the recent crisis and the present system is close to EU standards and an 
independent regulator exists. Of particular note, in this connection, is the fact that Turkey has an 
independent central bank since May 2001, and inflation accounting has been introduced as of the 
beginning of 2004. Of course, the new system is not yet fully tested but the new structure 
combined with a more stable macroeconomic outlook is sure to provide grounds for much greater 
stability and efficiency.  
•  Third, the banking system is already open to the outside world.  Foreign banks are formally 
welcomed and there are no capital controls. The fact that foreign banks are not assuming a very 
important role in TBS is less the result of a “protective policy” than the result of strong 
competition that makes it difficult for foreign banks to capture easily market shares.  In the past 
macroeconomic instability was certainly also a deterrent. However, as the failed acquisition of a 
controlling share of GarantiBank by Bank Intesa (Italy) demonstrates, Turkish and EU valuation 
standards still diverge in areas such as non-performing loans. Turkish authorities would send a 
convincing signal about changed priorities to international markets if they invited foreign banks to 
compete for acquisition of the banks presently in administration and restructuring. One of the 
pillars of the EU banking framework is mutual recognition of banking licenses. This is a much 
more distant consideration as Turkey cannot yet be part of the single passport rule (implying that a 
bank licensed in any member country can operate in all others without national approval) which is 
based on reciprocity. 
•  Fourth, financial development – as measured by the degree of financial intermediation – is still 
lagging as it is in the new member countries taken as comparators. In 2003, the deposits-to-GDP 
ratio was 50% in Turkey, favourably comparing to 35% in Poland or 39% in Hungary, but the 
loans-to-GDP ratio was 25%, as it was in Poland and short of the 29% in Hungary. As we 
explained in the main text, financial development will strongly benefit from macro-stability. 
•  Fifth, for reasons of distorting the playing field and efficiency, government ownership is often 
considered a negative factor. In Turkey, state banks account for close to 40% of deposits and little 
more than 20% of loans. This compares unfavourably to most new member countries, yet it should 
be recalled that in Germany, for example, public sector banks hold more than 50% of the market. 
The question is whether the privatisation of state banks should be a policy priority. In the past 
state banks were extremely politicised and badly run, and this danger still exists. Then again, the 
public sector banks have specific missions, such as lending to the agricultural sector or to SMEs, 
and private banks may not be able to fully fill these vacuums. It may therefore not only be difficult 
to privatise these state banks but even somewhat undesirable from a public policy viewpoint. The 
alternative would appear to be to avoid distorting the playing field and ensure that state banks 
pursue and stick to their targets. This would require a discontinuation of their privileges, such as 
the restriction that state and foundation funds be exclusively deposited with state banks. Even 
better, they should be transformed into ‘narrow’ banks that cannot receive deposits at all and must 
refinance in the market. This would correct the present anomaly of their strong role in deposit 
collection, of which only one-fourth is used for loans, thereby depriving private banks of deposits. 
As argued in section 4, this would give a boost to the development of domestic money and capital 
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Although state ownership is not an obstacle to acceptance in the European banking family, state 
subsidies may run foul of EU competition rules. This does not seem, however, to be a problem in 
Turkey, as subsidies are specific to sectors which receive particular treatment in the EU as well. 
There are no institutions comparable to the German Landesbanken, which have had problems with 
EU competition rules. 
•  Sixth, as in most countries, part of the TBS is inefficient, but some banks are very efficient. A 
study of the efficiency of European banks by Wagenvoort & Schure (1999), shows that the 
average of banks in some EU countries deviates as much as 60% from the ‘optimal-cost curve’ 
(i.e., they suffer from a so-called ‘x-inefficiency’). By that standard, Turkey is not an outlier in the 
European sample. As for intermediation margins, there are no readily available data on Turkey 
that could be used for comparison with EU countries and a bare look at the margins could be 
somewhat misleading owing to several factors (e.g., interest-rate volatility or heavy taxation in the 
financial sector), but the margins look high nevertheless: for instance, for consumer loans, the 
margin was over 6 percentage points until recently – well above EU averages.
26 In summary 
though, it is hard to argue that the TBS is notably less efficient than some of its European 
competitors. 
•  Finally, is the TBS able to meet, by 2007, the Basle II standards? In this paper we have shown that 
in 2003 most of the private banks had very high capital ratios. The concern is that Basle II, which 
attributes higher capital coverage for risky assets, including government debt, will present a 
difficult challenge for Turkish banks. It needs to be recognised, however, that Basle II also 
presents considerable advantages to the banking sector in a country such as Turkey. In particular, 
Basle II has eliminated the ‘sovereign floor’. This implies that banks can now be rated higher than 
their government, with a minimum of 20% remaining. Turkish government debt is rated B+ so that 
banks have to risk-weight the holding of Turkish government paper or credits with 100%. Yet this 
only applies to banks outside of Turkey. It is at national discretion to set the risk-weights for 
national debt in national currency held by banks incorporated in the country. This implies that the 
Turkish authorities can maintain these risk weights at 0%. Banks would then prefer to hold 
government debt in national rather than foreign currency. As the large majority of securities held 
by banks are government securities, at least for those denominated in Turkish lira, there would be 
no change in capital requirements. The only additional requirement would be capital backing for 
operational risk. Hence, despite the reluctance of the banking sector in accepting Basle II, with an 
unchanged asset structure the impact will be anything but dramatic. 
By contrast, if the asset structure changes significantly before 2007, then Turkish banks will need 
more capital. As is to be hoped and expected, the share of credits to the private sector will increase 
at the expense of a lower share of government securities. If in addition (as is again to be hoped), 
Turkey embarks on a path of strong growth, then bank lending will not only produce a reallocation 
of a constant balance sheet but generate growing bank assets to be backed by more equity. If all 
goes well, the higher the growth achieved the more bank capital will be needed. But, in such an 
environment of improved systemic confidence, greater macro-stability and more robust growth, it 
should not be difficult to find the required equity.  
Of course, not all banks will do well. This is the message of competition. Some already start with 
weaker financial indicators and others will fall prey to unwise position-taking. If, therefore, there 
are weaker banks that have difficulties with respect to Basle II it may be better to find a way out 
rather than closing them. In order to avoid limiting the growth of the sector and overburdening the 
deposit insurance scheme, one could proceed as follows. In many countries there are different 
classes of banks. This may be the case because international banks are the only ones that have to 
adopt Basle II; the US serves as another example, where regulatory authorities are different for 
various classes of banks. In no country are specialised investment banks part of the banking 
                                                 
26 Consumer loans were made at interest rates close to 40% while savings deposits fetched less than 23% 
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franchise and hence the monetary system. In the literature, Bryan (1998) has proposed splitting up 
banks and applying regulation and deposit insurance only to ‘deposit banks’, i.e. banks that collect 
deposits and invest these receipts in liquid money-market instruments (Gros & Steinherr, 1995, 
Bisignano, 1997 and Pierce, 1997). In Turkey one could apply this concept in the following 
manner. There could be two classes of banks – let’s call them A-class and B-class banks. A-class 
banks would be under the rule of Basle II, part of the domestic payments system and enjoy deposit 
insurance. B-class banks would have none of that. They would have to pay higher deposit rates, 
and in order to generate a profit take more risk in lending to SMEs. If a B-class bank fails, there 
will be no bailout. It is a firm like any other. They would not put at risk the payments or the 
deposit insurance scheme. The moral hazard in banking would be much reduced. Depositors 
would have a wider choice and could obtain higher returns by accepting a higher risk. This choice 
has value in a country where the capital market does not offer the range of products available in 
mature financial markets and where savers still lack financial sophistication. Of course, every 
bank would have to indicate clearly on its entry and its stationary whether it is an A-class or a B-
class bank. Perhaps the name ‘bank’ would be reserved for A-class banks. And B-class banks 
could be called ‘finance corporations’ or something similar (Gros & Steinherr, 2004).  
What is the bottom line then, regarding our main question? Is the TBS prepared for EU integration? 
Our conclusion is that in 2003 the TBS already compared well with the comparator countries and the 
banking sector is anything but an obstacle for EU membership. Of course, important improvements are 
still possible and there are some ten years to achieve that. In fact, an important point to keep in mind 
when analysing this question is exactly that: Turkey is still at least some ten years away from actual 
EU membership. Even then, in comparison with the new member countries or Greece, Portugal or 
Spain some ten years before their entry into the EU, the TBS appears very well placed, and clearly 
better than Poland was in 1994 – perhaps the most relevant comparator country. Yet, there is no room 
for complacency, and the Turkish authorities would be well advised to execute suggested reforms as 
quickly as possible given the critical role that the financial sector plays in the growth process. In that 
connection, much will depend on maintaining macro-stability and this, not the state of the banking 
sector, is a key question for the future development of the Turkish economy. 
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Annex 1 
The Imar Bank Scandal 
and the Regulatory Framework 
The collapse of Imar Bank as such was not a major surprise to close watchers of the TBS but the 
financial damage that resulted and the way it took place was truly shocking. The takeover as such was 
not a big surprise because Imar Bank had been on the Treasury’s watch-list – the regulatory authority 
before the BRSA was established – for almost ten years, as its loan portfolio, characterised by an 
exceptional connected-lending practice, consisted mainly of (direct and indirect) loans to companies 
owned by the Uzan Group. Once the BRSA was established, the new authority requested that Imar 
Bank shareholders re-capitalise the bank and reduce exposure to the Uzan Group. As no action was 
taken on either front, BRSA appointed a board member with veto powers in July 2001 and another 
representative was appointed to the board in December 2001. In 2002, during the May recap 
programme, the bank reduced its risk to Uzan Group companies; shareholders injected capital into 
Imar bank and the BRSA decided to withdraw the board member with veto powers in August 2002. 
With a BRSA representative still on the board, the problem seemed resolved and a takeover was 
avoided. 
The bank was hit again in June 2003 when the charters of the two regional power companies, which 
provided the bulk of the cash flow of the Uzan companies, were revoked by the Electricity Regulatory 
Board. This news led to a run on the bank and liquidity problems resulted. The board members of Imar 
Bank refused to cooperate with the BRSA and resigned their posts in late June. Meanwhile, the BRSA 
had only four board members and could not take a decision because a decision required at least five 
members. Upon the appointment by the government of the fifth member, the BRSA cancelled the 
deposit-taking license of Imar Bank and declared that all personal deposits were under government 
guarantee.  
The true and shocking scale of the problem emerged during the reconciliation carried out by the BRSA 
to finalise the amounts due to depositors. The most recent reports of Imar Bank to the BRSA, as late as 
late June 2003, had showed a total deposit amount of TL 750 trillion (around $0.5 billion). The 
investigation of depositors’ documents, however, revealed that this amount was actually TL 8.1 
quadrillion (more than $5 billion). The bank had also converted some offshore deposits (not covered 
by government guarantee) and sold Treasury bills to the public even though it did not have a license to 
do so. The bank maintained a double-accounting system throughout, where true information would 
exist at the branch level but the headquarters would falsify it and then report to the BRSA. 
In its essence, the Imar Bank case appeared to be a special case of skilled financial banditry, and as 
such should not be seen as a failure of banking supervision. These oversights also remain a general 
problem by international norms (e.g., Parmalat) and indicate a significant failure of information-
sharing among various government agencies, i.e., BRSA and others (such as the Capital Markets 
Board, Central Bank and Ministry of Finance). | 32 
Annex 2 
Survey Questionnaire 
Key challenges and structure 
What do you see as the three overriding problems/issues faced by the Turkish banking sector today? 
Please describe each one of them briefly. 
How do you see the sector’s structure evolving in the next three years? Specifically, do you think 
consolidation is over in the banking sector? If not, could the second wave of consolidation be as 
disorderly as the first wave? 
Do you think the banking sector is adequately capitalised? 
Competition 
Do you see state banks as a major competitor in general? In deposits? In loans? Please elaborate 
briefly. 
Why do you think the share of foreign banks has been small in the TBS? Do you see foreign entry 
increasing dramatically, as it has been in some of the EU accession countries (e.g., Poland)? 
Do you think the TBS is ready for free competition from the banking sectors of the EU countries, as 
called for in the EU’s Second Banking Directive? 
Financial indicators, asset composition, profitability 
How do you envisage the asset composition of your balance sheet evolving in three-years time? 
Could you please give us a description as to how your balance sheet will look in terms of 
percentages? 
How do you see your profits evolving in the next three years? Could you give us a description of its 
composition? 
Regulation and restructuring programme 
What are your thoughts on the regulatory environment in Turkey today (e.g., is it on par with 
international standards? What do you see as key strengths and weaknesses?) 
What are the implications of the envisaged reduction in deposit coverage to TL 50 billion by July 
2004? Is TL 50 billion an appropriate level for Turkey? 
How ready are you for risk-based supervision? 
How do you see the performance of the BRSA’s banking rehab programme launched in May 2001? 
Where do you see its major strengths? Weaknesses? 
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Annex 3 
EU Commission Reports 
on Financial Sector Development in Turkey 
This annex reproduces sections pertaining to the financial sector from the three most recent EU regular 
progress reports (see European Commission, 2001, 2002 and 2003). 
2001 Regular Report  
The financial sector is still under restructuring and does not channel sufficient financial resources to 
productive investment. The financial sector mainly consists of the banking sector. During the 1990s this 
sector expanded rapidly, benefiting from generous state insurance for savings and deposits, and strong 
public sector credit demand. As a result of political interference in the banking sector, chronically high 
inflation, weak legislation and insufficient surveillance, the Turkish banking sector accumulated 
substantial structural weaknesses. The banking sector consists of about 70 institutions. The four main 
state controlled banks account for about 30% of the sector's assets and for nearly 35% of the deposits. 
The privatisation of those state banks is overdue. Another 30% of the sector's assets are controlled by the 
4 largest private banks. About 10% of the assets are owned by 18 non-operative banks, which have been 
transferred into the custody of the Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The share of government 
securities in private bank assets is relatively high at about 25%. Bank lending accounts for about 23% of 
GDP and is highly concentrated in the public sector and related group companies. As a result, only 0.1% 
of all borrowers account for nearly 40% of the total loan value. Stock market capitalisation is at about 
20% of GDP. After the financial crisis, the share of non-performing loans in total loans rose to 18%, 
mainly due to the sharp rise of non-performing loans of state controlled banks, in particular of the banks 
under the administration of the Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund. 
Progress in addressing the weakness of the financial sector has been achieved. The state controlled 
banks have been re-capitalised and their short-term exposure has been substantially reduced. Private 
banks have been obliged to improve their capital adequacy ratios and to adhere to international reporting 
and prudential standards. Non-viable private banks have been put under the administration of the SDIF, 
where they are in the process of being restructured and reorganised. The banking regulations have been 
further strengthened. The establishment of the Banking Surveillance and Regulatory Agency (BRSA) in 
2000 has significantly improved banking surveillance and the adherence to prudential rules. However, 
the consolidation process is far from being completed. So far, only the smallest state-controlled bank, 
Emlak bankasi, has been dissolved. The two largest state banks, the agricultural bank, Ziraat bankasi, 
and a bank providing credits to SME’s, Halk bankasi, have been put under joint professional 
management and will be prepared for privatisation. Another state controlled bank, Vakif bankasi, is 
planned to be privatised soon. Some of the non-viable banks have been merged with the Sümerbank, 
which is supposed to be sold soon to Oyakbank, belonging to a support fund of the military staff. So far, 
one smaller bank, the Bank Ekspres, and the 9
th biggest bank in Turkey, the Demirbank, have been sold. 
2002 Regular Report  
The financial sector is still in the process of consolidation and does not yet channel sufficient savings 
towards productive investment. During the 1990s, the banking sector expanded rapidly, benefiting from 
high public-sector financing requirements and loose financial market regulations and supervision. 
Banking sector deposits rose from around 45% of GDP in 1997 to about 62% of GDP in 2001, while 
banking sector assets rose from around 80% to close to 100% of GDP. At the same time, domestic credit 
to the private sector remained at a relatively low level of about 20% of GDP. The Turkish banking sector 
is dominated by 3 state-dominated banks, accounting for nearly 30% of total assets, and a few big private 
banks, accounting for another third of the sector’s assets. Many of the important private banks are part of 
family-owned enterprise groups, the so-called ‘conglomerates’. As a result of complex ownership 
structures, compliance with prudential and transparency standards is difficult to assess. Their lending 
inside the enterprise group is not always in line with market principles or prudential standards. The 
difference between lending and borrowing rates has been high, pointing to inefficiencies in the sector. In 
addition, the overall profitability of the banking sector has declined markedly during recent years. 
A major banking crisis erupted in 2000-2001. During 2000, increasing tensions in the financial markets 
revealed major systemic weaknesses. Profitability declined as a result of the December 1999 
programme's success in reducing interest rates and public-sector borrowing requirements. Furthermore, 34 | STEINHERR, TUKEL & UCER 
 
tight conditions on the overnight money market posed major difficulties to banking institutions, which 
had specialised in refinancing medium-term credit on the overnight market. In particular state banks had 
been very exposed to this kind of activity, forcing them to roll-over on a daily basis up to 4% of GDP. 
Unexpected liquidity bottlenecks in November 2000 and February 2001 drove these overexposed banks 
close to bankruptcy. The authorities had to intervene and switch to a less strict monetary policy and give 
up the crawling peg exchange rate regime. The sharp depreciation of the currency after the floating 
eroded the capital base of some overexposed institutions.  
In order to address the banking sector's weaknesses, a major financial effort was necessary to restructure 
the financing profile of the troubled banks and to strengthen the sector's capital base. Furthermore, 
increased priority has been devoted to faster alignment of prudential regulations with international 
standards. Banking surveillance has been strengthened. Political interference with the lending of state 
banks to specific sectors, such as agriculture and SMEs, was reduced last year. So far, 19 non-viable 
banks, accounting for about 15% of the sector's total assets, have had to be transferred to the custody of 
the Savings Deposit Insurance Funds, reducing the number of operating banks to 57. The costs of bailing 
out the banking sector have led to a sharp increase in the public-sector debt ratio. As a result of improved 
transparency regulations and the economic recession, the share of non-performing loans in the banking 
sector's loan portfolio rose from 2.3% in 1997 to 12.9% in 2001. In order to alleviate the bad-loan issue, 
the government is supporting corporate debt restructuring through the so-called ‘Istanbul Approach’. 
Furthermore, the authorities are restructuring the state banks and preparing them for privatisation. One 
important step in this process has been the elimination of political interference in the management of the 
banks and the reduction in the number of branches. The privatisation of the state-dominated Vaquif bank 
is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2002. The other two state-dominated banks are supposed to be 
privatised as soon as possible. The recent transfer of one major private bank into the custody of the SDIF 
not only indicates that the cleaning-up process in the banking sector is still continuing, but also 
underlines the authorities' determination in proceeding with the sector's consolidation. 
2003 Regular Report  
The banking sector has been strengthened, but the restructuring and consolidation process is not yet 
completed. Turkish banking sector assets amounted to slightly more than 70% of GDP. Bank lending to 
the private sector has declined in recent years to about 17% of GDP, while the share of securities has 
increased to about 30% of GDP. About 90% of the security portfolio consists of government securities. 
The banking sector currently includes some 50 banks, but in fact is dominated by two state banks, 
amounting to about one-third of the total sector’s assets, and a few private banks. In order to prepare the 
state banks for privatisation, political interference has been reduced and the number of branches has been 
decreased. However, so far, no privatisation has taken place. The legal framework for mergers and 
acquisitions has been amended with a view to accelerating consolidation in the banking sector. During 
the last year, the process of improving the shock resilience of the banking sector has continued. In order 
to strengthen banking sector surveillance, the independent Banking Regulatory and Surveillance Agency 
(BRSA) was established in autumn 2000. During the last year, the competence of the BRSA has been 
enhanced and stricter prudential standards have been implemented. However, the efficiency of banking 
sector supervision is sometimes impeded by insufficient human resources and the slow speed of legal 
proceedings. The capital base of the banking sector has been strengthened and systemic weaknesses, such 
as a high exposure to foreign exchange risks, have been addressed. Most of the non-viable banks, which 
have been transferred under the administration of the public Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), 
have been dissolved. In July, the BRSA withdrew the banking licence of a smaller private bank and 
transferred it under SDIF administration. However, the dispute around the closure of one bank belonging 
to one of the influential conglomerates proves the need to further strengthen and clarify the legal and 
institutional framework dealing with banking sector surveillance. The main source of banking income is 
highly concentrated on interest earnings from government securities, which account for about 50% of 
total income. As a result of highly profitable and low risk bearing public sector borrowing, credit 
provision to the private sector has been particularly low. The recapitalisation of state banks, the 
elimination of non-viable banks and restructuring support in the form of the ‘Istanbul Approach’ has 
helped to improve the sector’s capitalisation. Nevertheless, the assets of many banks are still vulnerable 
to a deterioration of their loan portfolio. Profitability of the banking sector improved after the 2001 crisis. 
Since autumn 2002, domestic currency lending spreads have remained at around 11%, while foreign 
exchange lending spreads have declined from 4.7% in September 2002 to 3.6% in April 2003.  
2004 CEPS Publications 
Paperback Books (€25 in print or €10 in PDF) 
Breaking the Reform Deadlock, 6
th Annual Report of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group, Daniel 
Gros, Thomas Mayer, Roberto Perotti and Angel Ubide, July 2004 
The EU Constitution: In the Making, Kimmo Kiljunen, May 2004 
Readings in European Security, Vol. 2, Dana H. Allin, Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl (eds), 
March 2004 
The Nine Lives of the Stability Pact, Special Report of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group, 
Daniel Gros, Thomas Mayer and Angel Ubide, February 2004 
The Wider Europe Matrix, Michael Emerson, January 2004 
EU-Turkey Working Papers (€12 in print or available for free downloading from www.ceps.be) 
No. 3  Turkey in the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Joanna Apap, Sergio Carrera and 
Kemal Kirişci, August, 2004 
No. 2  European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy, Senem Aydın and E. 
Fuat Keyman, August, 2004 
No. 1  Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy, Michael 
Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, August 2004 
CEPS Research Reports in Finance and Banking (€40 in print or €20 in PDF) 
No. 34  Banking Consolidation in the EU: Overview and Prospects, Rym Ayadi and Georges Pujals, 
April 2004 
No. 33  Securities Market Regulation in the EU: Everything You Always Wanted to Know about the 
Lamfalussy Procedure, Karel Lannoo and Mattias Levin, April 2004 
CEPS Task Force Reports (€25 in print or €10 in PDF) 
No. 51  The New Basel Capital Accord and the Future of the European Financial System, Rym Ayadi 
and Andrea Resti, April 2004 
No. 50  A New European Agenda for Labour Mobility, Anna Turmann, April 2004 
No. 49  Completion of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in the Emerging Global Climate Regime, 
Christian Egenhofer and Noriko Fujiwara, March 2004 
CEPS Working Documents (€12 in print or available for free downloading from www.ceps.be) 
No. 207  On Sustainability of the Balance of Payments Deficits in the Baltic Countries, Jorgen Drud 
Hansen and Morten Hansen, July 2004 
No. 206  Measuring  the Economic Impact of an EU-GCC FTA, Dean A. DeRosa and David 
Kernohan, July, 2004 
No. 205  Why is there a productivity problem in Europe?, Francesco Daveri, July 2004 
No. 204  Theorising European Strategic Culture: Between Convergence and the Persistence of 
National Diversity, Christoph Meyer, June 2004 
No. 203  R&D and the Financing of Ideas in Europe, Laura Bottazzi, forthcoming 2004 
No. 202  Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: What role for the SGP?, Jørgen Mortensen, June 
2004  
 
No. 201  Economic Prospects for Kaliningrad: Between EU Enlargement and Russia’s Integration 
into the World Economy, Evgeny Vinokurov, June 2004 
No. 200  Business Cycle Synchronisation in the Enlarged EU: Co-Movements in the New and Old 
Members, Zsolt Darvas and György Szapáry, March 2004 
No. 199  Searching for the Determinants of IT Investment: Panel Data Evidence on European 
Countries, Paolo Guerrieri, Cecilia Jona-Lasinio and Stefano Manzocchi, January 2004 
CEPS Policy Briefs (€12 in print or available for free downloading from www.ceps.be) 
No. 56  R&D in the EU: Can the Open Method of Coordination Succeed in Closing the Gap?, Daniel 
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